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ABSTRACT
Commenting platforms, such as Disqus, have emerged as a major
online communication platform with millions of users and posts.
Their popularity has also attracted parasitic and malicious behav-
iors, such as trolling and spamming. There has been relatively
little research on modeling and safeguarding these platforms. As
our key contribution, we develop a systematic approach to detect
malicious users on commenting platforms focusing on having: (a)
interpretable, and (b) fine-grained classification of malice. Our work
has two key novelties: (a) we propose two classifications methods,
with one following a two stage approach, which first maps observ-
able features to behaviors and then maps these behaviors to user
roles, and (b) we use a comprehensive set of 73 features that span
four dimensions of information. We use 7 million comments during
a 9 month period, and we show that our classification methods
can distinguish between benign, and malicious roles (spammers,
trollers, and fanatics) with a 0.904 AUC. Our work is a solid step to-
wards ensuring that commenting platforms are a safe and pleasant
medium for the exchange of ideas.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Any successful medium eventually attracts abusive behaviors, and
commenting platforms is no exception. Over the last decade, com-
menting on news articles has emerged as a new form of highly
social interaction. First, a small number of companies facilitate the
backend management of comments for a wide range of websites.
We use the term commenting platform to refer to such platforms,
which include Disqus [6], LiveFyre [12], and IntenseDebate [11].
Second, commenting is an intense activity for many users, who can
spend many hours daily at it.
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We list a set of definitions that we use in this paper. A user is
defined by a platform account, which enables her to leave comments
to articles on a website that uses the commenting platform. A user
may leave multiple comments for an article, which leads us to define
the engagement of a user for that article. An engagement has a
time duration and intensity in terms of number of comments. In
lack of a better term, when two users comment on the same article,
we say that they collaborate and we use the term collaboration
to describe this activity. We use the term collaboration intensity
referring the number of articles for which two users collaborate.
The key question in our work is: Can we automatically detect
malicious users in these commenting platform? Specifically, we frame
the problem as follows. The input is the commenting information of
the users. This includes: the author of the comment, the time it was
posted, and information on the article it was posted for. The goal
is to identify malicious behaviors and users. Detecting parasitic
and abusive behaviors is a critical building block for ensuring that
these platforms serve their primary purpose, which is the honest
and safe exchange of opinions among readers.
Commenting platforms have attracted little attention so far with
only few exceptions [2][1]. Most work on modeling and misbehav-
ior detection focuses on Online Social Networks (OSNs), and blogs.
In Section 6, we survey the key related areas including: (a) detecting
abusive behaviors and malware propagation in OSNs[3][14]; (b)
modeling online user behavior[7] [5] [9][8] [16]; and (c) analyzing
text of online users[17][13][18].
We propose a systematic comprehensive methodology to iden-
tify malicious users on commenting platforms to enable: (a) inter-
pretable, and (b) fine-grained classification of malicious behavior.
We claim four key novelties in our work.
a. A behavior-based classification. We propose two classifi-
cation methods, the first one use typical Random Forest classifier
yet another one introduces a two-stage classification approach. In
this method, we map: (a) observable features to behaviors, and
(b) behaviors into user roles, using unsupervised and supervised
learning respectively.
b. A comprehensivemultidimensional feature set.We com-
bine 73 features from four different dimensions of user interactions:
(a) social interaction or user-user interaction, (b) engagement or
user-article interaction, (c) temporal features, and (d) linguistic
features.
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c. Fine-grained malicious role identification. Our approach
goes beyond a good versus bad determination to a more fined-
grained classification of misbehaving roles. Here, we focus on three
roles: (a) spammers, (b) trolls, and (c) fanatics, which are defined
in the next section. However, it is easy to introduce more roles as
long as appropriate ground truth is available.
d. Interpretable classification. The results of our approach
are interpretable, since they are behavior-centric. A system admin-
istrator can better understand or tweak the definition of, say, a
spammer, by looking at the behaviors that constitute its definition
(e.g. high number of repeated text across articles, low engagement
per article).
Our study is grounded on nearly 7 million comments from nearly
200K users over 9 months fromDiscus, which is arguably the largest
commenting platform. Here we highlight some interesting result
from our study.
a. Identifyingmisbehaving users with 0.904 AUC.Our clas-
sifier can efficiently identify misbehaving users and it outperforms
the baseline we compare with.
b. The role classification result achieves 80.8% overall ac-
curacy.
c.We find patterns of misbehaving users from their inter-
pretable latent behavior. An example latent behavior indicates
that making longer comments and using capital letters more fre-
quently is a sign of misbehaving users, and the later the active hour
of a users, the more likely they are to misbehave.
d. Large scale study. About 0.9% of total users in our data-set
are misbehaving users, and CNBC has the largest percentage of
misbehaving users which is 1.48%. Only 15% of the misbehaving
users exhibit a cross-website behavior.
2 DATA COLLECTION AND DEFINITIONS
Disqus is one of the most widely-used commenting service provider
today with a billion unique visitors a month and installed by more
than two and a half million sites, including ABC News, Rolling
Stone, IGN, Bloomberg and more.
Data Collection. We collected data from Disqus through its
Application Programming Interface (API). The API can be used to
collect all the comments for a given article, and for all the articles
of a given website. However, the functionality of collecting all the
comments for a given user would have been useful for our study,
but it became unavailable in 2014 for privacy reasons.
Using the website-centric API, we collect data from four popular
websites: (a) CNBC News, (b) ABC News, (c) Bloomberg Views
and (d) Breaking News - a Disqus channel. The first three are well-
known news websites and the last one is the most popular channel
on Disqus. A channel is similar to a newsfeed, whose articles are
selected by the users that participate in that channel. We collect
all comments posted at articles published on these 4 sources in
between Nov 1st 2015 and July 31st 2016. The dataset consists of:
(a) 286,275 articles, (b) 6,994,693 comments and (c) 201,112 unique
users, (d) 1,705,667 engagements.
Establishing the ground truth ofmisbehaving users.A key
challenge in our work is the need for ground truth of misbehaving
users. Fortunately, Disqus enables users to report misbehaving com-
ments and the number of reports a comment received is provided
by Disqus API. In our 7M comments, we have 66.4k comments
reported as “bad/inappropriate" by the community. We will further
discuss this in Section 4 and show how we leverage this to identify
misbehaving users.
Roles of misbehaving users and ground truth.We identify
and attempt to detect three different roles of misbehaving users:
trolls, spammers and fanatics. These are inherently difficult to de-
fine, so we resort to human feedback.
We define three malicious roles below. We show here the defini-
tions that we gave our evaluators, as we explain in Section 4.
(1) Trolls. Users who make inflammatory or inappropriate com-
ments for the sole purpose of upsetting other users and pro-
voking a response.
(2) Spammers. Users who repeatedly make similar comments
in the same or multiple articles.
(3) Fanatics. Users who exhibits an extreme and uncritical en-
thusiasm in religion or politics.
3 FEATURES AND USER BEHAVIOR
In this section, we identify and study features that relate to user
behavior on the Disqus platform. Although studying each of these
features in depth is of independent interest, the goal is to identify
meaningful features that can help us detect misbehavior. Due to
space limitations, we can only provide highlights of the features
and their distributions. In Table 1, we outline the features that we
use in Section 4.
We study the behavior of users along four dimensions: (a) en-
gagement behavior (user-article interaction), (b) social behavior
(user-user interaction), (c) temporal behavior, and (d) linguistic
properties.
3.1 Engagement behavior
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Figure 1: Engagement behavior: Distribution of intensity
and duration of engagements.
We quantify the engagement (user - article interaction) with 7
different features. Six of them are derived from twomajor properties:
The engagement duration is the time interval between the first
comment and the last comment user makes on the article. If the user
leaves only one comment, we consider this as zero length interval.
The engagement intensity is the total number of comments user
makes on the article.
Engagement duration: 90% last for less than 10 hours, but
some can be as long as half an year. In Figure 1, we plot the
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Table 1: The overview of the 73 features we use per Dimension
Dimension Features Count
Engagement number of engagements, engagement duration*, engagement intensity* 7
Social degrees, number of maximal cliques, number of triangles (in different level of collaboration intensity) 17
Temporal number of comments made in 24-hour slots, highly-active hour 25
Linguistic number of words*, number of sentences*, percentage of capital letters*, readability metrics, number of
URLs
24
* We use several statistical versions (mean, maximum and minimum) of the feature per engagements, user or comment.
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the duration (top x-
axis) for all 1.7M engagements. We find that 90% of engagements
last less than 10 hours and have less than 7 comments. Interestingly,
we find 106 engagements which last for more than half year!
Engagement intensity: 90% have less than 7 comments,
but 0.06% have more than 100 comments. In Figure 1, we plot
the CDF of the intensity (bottom x-axis) for all engagements. We
find that 90% of them have less than 7 comments, while 1,151 (0.06%)
of them have more than 100 comments.
High intensity is correlated with misbehavior. The obser-
vations above raise the question: is unusually high engagement
intensity associated with misbehavior? Preliminary manual inspec-
tion suggests that these engagements contain many reported (by
the community) comments. We quantify the correlation between
engagement intensity and the total number of reported comments
in the engagement and we find a Pearson correlation coefficient
ρ = 0.53. This suggests that engagement intensity should be a good
metric in our classification.
3.2 Social Behavior
We propose 17 features to model the social interaction of the users,
which we define as the posting of comments to the same articles.
Single-article collaboration Threshold: θ comments. We
say that two users collaborate in one article, if they each post at
least θ comments on that article. For θ = 1, the graph become very
dense, and the analysis is both slow and less informative. In the
remaining of this work, we use a threshold θ = 2.
User-user collaboration intensity and threshold: λ articles.
The collaboration intensity is the number of articles that two users
collaborate for a given threshold θ . To study collaborations at differ-
ent levels of intensity, we introduce the collaboration intensity
threshold λ, which we use below.
We define the undirected weighted collaboration graph Gλ =
⟨Vλ ,Eλ⟩ of collaboration intensity λ where:
(1) Vλ is a set nodes v , representing users.
(2) Eλ is the set of edges, where edge ei j between nodes vi and
vj exists, if and only if the collaboration intensity of the
users exceeds the threshold of λ articles. The edge weight
w(ei j ) is set to the collaboration intensity.
The collaboration graph (for θ = 2 and λ = 0) has 95,527 users
and roughly 21 millions edges, an average degree of 440.7 and a
median degree of 137. Note that we do not include users with zero
degree in this graph.
In Figure 2(a), we plot the CDF of the user degrees (bottom x-
axis) and the edge weight distributions (top x-axis). We see that
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Figure 2: Social behavior: (a) theCDFof the user degrees (bot-
tom x-axis) and the edge weight distributions (top x-axis),
(b) CDF of the number of cliques and triangles of user in the
G128 collaboration graph.
90% of the users have degree lower than 1,054, the max degree goes
to 26,318: this user collaborates with more than 27% of users in the
graph! The figure also shows that 90% of the edges have weights
less than 2. Although it is not easy to gauge from the plot, we find
12,374 edges with weight over 64, 1,779 edges with weight over 128
and 65 edges with weight over 256. In other words, there are 65
pairs of users who have collaborated on more than 256 articles.
Capturing the collaboration groups: triangles and cliques.
We quantify the local connectivity of the users using the number
of maximal cliques and triangles in which a user participates. Both
these metrics capture how densely connected the neighbors of
that user are. Figure 2(b) shows the distribution of triangles and
maximal cliques of user in graph, for λ equals to 128. We do not
count "trivial" cliques of size two. We see that 50% of users have
less than 27 triangles on the neighborhood, 90% of have less than
376, but there are 1% with more than 868 triangles. We also see
that 90% of users have less than 51 maximal cliques and there are 8
users, who participate in more than 186 cliques which is more than
50% of all maximal cliques in the graph. These highly collaborative
users are suspicious and this encouraged us to consider both these
features for misbehavior detection.
3.3 Temporal behavior
We quantify the temporal behavior of users with 25 features.
Most users exhibit persistent behavior: daily and weekly.
We use the time and day of the week plot to understand the
temporal behavior of the users. The plot shows the number of
comments in each hour-of-day and day-of-week as a heat-map.
Figure 3(a) shows this behavior for all the users, but individual users
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exhibit similar daily and weekly behavior, as we will see below. On
the x-axis (hour-of-day), we see that the commenting activities
increase at the beginning of day in the east coast as annotated in
the plot, the peak hours cross the noon period of both east and west
coasts then drop sharply after that. Given the news websites we are
studying, it is reasonable to assume a US-centric user majority. In
y-axis (day-of-week), the activity increases at the start of the week,
peaks in the middle, and drops before the weekend. Combining
the two observations, we see that Disqus users post most of their
comments during the common work-hours in the week. Note that
the same pattern is also observed on other social networks, like
Facebook [21] and Twitter [19].
The plot lead us to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: A typical user makes most of her comments in a
period of 3-4 hours in a day.
The highly-active hours of users commenting behavior.
To assess the validity of our hypothesis, we would like to answer the
question: how many hours a day does a user spend commenting?
Determining this hides subtleties as: (a) patterns can vary from day
to day, and (b) it could be that many hours have non-zero activity
due to averaging over a long period. Thus, we opt to capture how
“focused" or "spread" is the commenting activity of the user. We
define highly-active hours to be the minimum number of hours,
during which the user makes more than 50% of their total comments
during a day on average.
Highly-active hours is less than 4 hours for 96.7% of the
users. The distribution of the users’ highly-active hours is shown
in Figure 3(b). The plot shows that 96.7% of users have highly-
active hours less than four hours, which matches our hypothesis.
Interestingly, we find 368 users who have more than 8 highly-active
hours, a significantly wider spread. Upon inspection, many of these
users have non-trivial activity over 14 hours in a day. This wide
range of behaviors suggests that highly-active hours can be a useful
metric for our classification.
3.4 Linguistic properties
We identify and study 24 linguistic features from the text of the
posts, such as the length of the comment, several metrics readability,
number of URLs, but discuss only a two metrics.
Only 1.9% of comments containURLs.We naturally consider
the existence of URLs in a comment as a feature in our classification:
their presence can indicate ad-oriented spamming. We find that
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Figure 3: Temporal behavior. (a) Time and day of the week
plot. (b) The distribution of highly-active hours of users.
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Figure 4: Linguistic property: number of words in a com-
ment
only 1.9% of all comments contain one or more URLs. We also find
that only 1.7% of the users have ever posted more than 3 comments
containing URLs. In fact, our interaction with the data suggests that
often users will use URLs as references in support of their opinions.
Length: 91% of comments have less than 100 words. The
length of a comment is a good metric for the interest and the time
a user is willing to spend expressing her opinion about the article.
In Figure 4, we plot the distribution of the number of words in
a comment in three different ways: (a) across all comments, (b)
the average comment length per user, and (c) minimum comment
length per user. We see that 91% of comments have less than 100
words, while roughly 20% of the comments with less than 10 words.
Interestingly, we also find 14,838 (0.002%) comments with more
than 500 words, which is roughly equivalent to 1.5 pages (per word-
stopages.com with Times New Roman, 12 font-size, single-spacing):
the comment is the size of small article!
Lengthy comments aremore likely to be spam.We examine
the lengthy comments (>500 words) and find out that 47% of them
are verbatim copies of at least one other comment from the same
user in our dataset. This is an indication of spamming especially
in its broader definition that we adopt here. Such phenomenon is
more pronounced for higher word counts: 63% of comments have
verbatim copies for length over 1,000 words , and 83% of comments
with length 2,000 words or longer. This suggests that comment
length is a helpful feature in detecting misbehavior.
4 FEATURE-BASED MISBEHAVIOR
IDENTIFICATION
Having identified interesting features, we develop a method to
identify misbehaving users and their effectiveness. For convenience,
we outline the features in Table 1, and we intend to define them in
detail in an extended version of this paper.
A. Establishing the ground truth. To overcome the lack of
absolute truth, we rely on “proxy signals". Here, we use the com-
munity’s own opinion: any user can report (a.k.a. flag) a comment
as “inappropriate". Below, we explain how we use this community
feedback to construct the ground truth, as the process hides several
subtleties.
Ground-truth: Reportings per malicious comment. To in-
crease our confidence, we set a minimum threshold of reports, ϕ,
that a comment must have to labeled malicious. The rationale is that
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Figure 5: (a) Distribution of reported comments of a user. (b)
Number of users having k reported comments.
a single reporting can be created even accidentally (the authors have
regrettably done this once). After analysis and deliberation omitted
here, we settled on ϕ = 3 reportings. We use the term reported
comment to refer to a comment with more than ϕ reports.
Ground-truth: Reported comments per malicious user. In
the same vain, we want to be careful in labeling a user as malicious
based on the number of reported comments. We use the reported
comments threshold, r , to control tune the definition of malicious
user.
Roughly 86% of the users have no reported comments.We
plot the distribution of the total number of reported comments
for each user in Figure 5(a). We find that 86.2% of users have no
reported comments, and only 1.6% of users have more than 10
reported comments.
We consider users with zero reported comments as benign for
the purpose of establishing the ground truth.
Building the ground truth datasets: Dr . We create a set of
labeled datasets as follows. First, we distinguish reported users into
groups, Rr (i), with r (i) = 2i , f or i = 0, 1, ... A user is in group Rr (i),
if the number of her reported comments are greater or equal r (i). It
turns out that no user has more than 128 reported comments. The
numbers of users in each group with threshold r (i) are shown in
Figure 5(b). Second, we create datasets Dr (i) by randomly selecting
200 reported users from Rr (i), and combining them with 200 benign
users (zero reported comment).
Benign user selection: Minimizing the effect of the num-
ber of comments of a user.When selecting the 200 benign users
to build the datasets, we follow the insightful approach of the earlier
in this space [2]. Namely, we find benign users that “match" the
number of comments of reported users. The goal is to minimize the
dominant role that the number of comments of a user can play. First,
the number of comments and number of reported comments of a
user are strongly positively correlated with a Pearson Correlation
Coefficient of 0.73. Second, most users have few comments given
the skewness of the distribution. Thus, a purely random selection
of benign users would have probably created a low-activity benign
set in terms of user comments, and a highly-active reported users.
The classification would have been very accurate by relying heavily
on the number posts.
B. The benign-malicious classification. For the classification,
we use the Random Forest classifier provided by Weka [22], which
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Figure 6: (a) Classification results as a function of the num-
ber of reported comments that “incriminate" a user. (b) AUC
of our approach and the baseline.
gave the best results among many that we tried. We perform ten-
fold cross validation and report the precision, recall, and ROC
curve (AUC) of each dataset in Figure 6(a). The plot shows that our
features can identify reported users with more than 80% precision
when the threshold r is larger than 16.
Selecting reported comments threshold r = 32. We man-
ually examined reported users in D16, D32 and D64 by sampling
20 users from each group. We find that users with more than 16
reported comments exhibit a persistent misbehavior throughout
their lifetime. The 40 reported users sampled from D32 and D64
are 100% labeled as misbehaving users by our independent human
evaluators. This gives us confidence to claim that users with 32
or more reported comments are misbehaving users. Thus, we use
dataset D32 as reference below.
The baseline classifier. We adapt and use a previously pro-
posed algorithm as a reference in our study [2]. That work focuses
on predicting whether a user will get banned in the future, which
is a somewhat different goal from our work.
We faithfully reproduce the reference method [2], which also
uses the Random Forest technique like we do. In their work, they
use 35 features, however 6 are not publicly available, namely the
website moderator features, such as the number of up-votes given
to others (similar to a Facebook “Like”). Unfortunately, we were
not able to access those features through the public API, therefore
we do not use them in our experiments.
The accuracy of our method exhibits 90% AUC. For clarity
of presentation, we only show the comparison of AUC of the two
methods in Figure 6(b). Our method performs better than the base-
line classifier, with the caveat that both approaches are restricted
to the publicly available features. The most interesting conclusion
is that our features have good discriminatory power in classifying
misbehaving and benign users.
C. The fine-grained malicious role classification. The nov-
elty of the work relies partly on going beyond the “malicious" label
to the role of the misbehaving user.
Ground truth for the roles of misbehaving users. Here, we
resort to manual labeling to create our reference data: we exam-
ine 200 misbehaving users in D32 and categorize them into three
different roles: trolls, spammers and fanatics. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work that does such a fine-grained clas-
sification of user behaviors, especially in commenting platforms.
MIS2, 2018, Marina Del Rey, CA, USA Tai Ching Li, Joobin Gharibshah, Evangelos E. Papalexakis, and Michalis Faloutsos
Table 2: Role classification result
Role Precision Recall
Trolls 86.4% 73.1%
Spammers 58.6% 81%
Fanatics 86.1% 73.3%
Benign 81% 87.5%
Overall accuracy 80.8%
Each user is labeled by three evaluators who were presented
with the definitions in Section 2. In absence of unanimity, we set
their role by taking the majority label. Out of 200 misbehaving
users, 104 are labeled as trolls, 21 as spammers and 75 as fanatics.
Role classification: Our approach has 80.8% overall accu-
racy. Having ground truth, we apply 10-fold cross validation with
the same classifier and the same 73 features that we used to identify
misbehaving users. Our result shows that our model can effectively
classify the role of misbehaving users with an overall accuracy of
80.8% as shown in Table 2. For all the classes the recall is above 73%
and the precision above 81% except the Spammers.
The community shows tolerance to non-provocative spam-
mers. Intrigued by the low precision for spammers, we find that
spam comments without provocative language, swear words and
sarcasm often do not get reported by the community. Recalling
Section 3.4, the unusually long comments are more likely to be
spam, due to verbatim repetitions. However, this behaviors seems
to either escape detection or be met with tolerance.
Ourmethod identifies un-reported spammers.We examine
the 12 false positive in the spam category: our spam label is not
corroborated by the community. We actually find that at least one
of these users exhibits clear spamming behavior, as she repeats the
exact same comment 3 times in one article and 5 times in another.
This investigation suggests that our approach could be catching
parasitic behaviors that the community could miss. As a result,
the accuracy of our algorithm could be better than reported here,
especially for spammers.
D. Studying the misbehaving users in the wild.
We apply the classier to the whole dataset to understand how
misbehaving users distributed in the wild. For identifying misbehav-
ing users, the classifier labeled 1,738 (0.86%) users as misbehaving
with confidence over 80%. The role classification results are: 866
users are labeled as trolls, 165 users are labeled as spammers and
597 users are labeled as fanatics. We also study how misbehaving
users distributed in each websites, the result is shown in Table 3.
It shows that CNBC has the largest number of misbehaving users
with 1,167 which is 1.48% of total users active on the website while
the rest of websites are at most 0.56% of users are misbehaving
users. Again, we only label misbehaving users with confidence over
80%.
5 INTERPRETABLE TWO-STAGE
CLASSIFICATION
In this section, we introduce a novel, two-stage approach in classi-
fying misbehaving users. In the first step we identify tightly-knit
Table 3: Misbehaving users in websites
Website Total users Misbehaving users
ABC News 129,053 717 (0.56%)
CNBC 78,618 1167 (1.48%)
Bloomberg Views 33,223 131 (0.39%)
Breaking-News (Dis-
qus channel) 11,607 48 (0.41%)
groups of users who exhibit very similar behavior across a cer-
tain subset of the features we discussed in the previous section.
Each such group of users and their associated features defines a
latent user behavior. Note that we do not define those latent user
behaviors a-priori, they rather emerge from the data automatically.
Subsequently, we use these latent user behaviors as our new fea-
tures towards classifying misbehaving users. The advantage of this
two-stage approach is that the latent user behaviors offer interpret-
ability of the results and allow for in-depth analysis of different
user (mis-)behaviors.
5.1 Identifying latent behaviors: Co-clustering
The first stage of our two-stage approach can be exactly mapped
to an instance of co-clustering. In a nutshell, co-clustering is the
simultaneous clustering of all data modalities. In our case, consider
a representation of a user in the vector space defined by the entire
set of their features. Hence, the modalities of our data are two:
“user” and “feature”. Co-clustering of a users × features data matrix
essentially yields different groups (or co-clusters), where each one
contains a subset of the users and a subset of the features. In other
words, when grouping users and features together, co-clustering
allows for the flexibility of finding a set of users that are highly
similar only for a subset of their features. This subset of features is
key to our method. Essentially, the subset of features of a co-cluster
defines a latent user behavior.
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Figure 7: Co-clustering discovers latent user behaviors and
the assignment of users and features to those behaviors.
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An illustrative example is shown in Figure 7, where we have four
distinct latent user behaviors: “Benign”, “Troll”, “Spammer”, and
“Fanatic”. After properly rearranging the users and the features,
in this simple example we see that each latent user behavior is
forming a block within the matrix. Notice that blocks can overlap
since: (a) in some cases a user can be classified with different types
of behavior, and (b) some features may be associated with multiple
types of behavior. Mathematically, each block (formally co-cluster)
in the data can be seen as (approximately) a rank-one matrix. By
definition, a rank-one matrix can be written as the outer product of
two vectors, i.e., abT . We, thus, can use the following formulation
for co-clustering, which was originally proposed in [15]:
min
A≥0,B≥0 ∥X − AB
T ∥ + λ
∑
i,r
|A(i, r )| + λ
∑
j,r
|B(j, r )| (1)
The above equation decomposes the data matrix X into a sum of
rank-one matrices (each one being approximately a co-cluster) and
the regularization penalties on the ℓ1 norms of matricesA,B (whose
columns hold the indicator vector for each co-cluster, as shown
in Fig. 7) ensure that the solution is sparse, so that only the users
and features that belong to a particular co-cluster have a non-zero
(and positive) value in our indicator vectors. Using this type of
overlapping co-clustering, a user may be assigned to multiple latent
behaviors at the same time, with varying degrees of participation.
This enhances interpretability because it can give further insight
on whether e.g., a user has more than one roles or their account has
been hijacked and some of their comments are benign but some
are malicious. Finally, the above co-clustering formulation is lossy,
which means that it does not require all users to belong to at least
one co-cluster. In other words, the above formulation focuses on
identifying the most dominant latent behaviors and the users that
engage in them, and leaves out users who do not clearly belong in
one (or more) of those latent behaviors. We, henceforth, refer to
those users as “non-clustered”.
5.2 Methodology
We apply co-clustering to the same dataset we used for role classifi-
cation. This dataset contains 200 benign users and 200 misbehaving
users, which include 104 trolls, 21 spammers and 75 fanatics. After
fine tuning the parameters of co-clustering, we find that the best
number of co-clusters in the data is 8. An indication for this number
is that the algorithm returned empty clusters for larger numbers
of clusters. We show the distribution of users in each clusters in
Figure 8(a).
The size of clusters varies from 29 to 268, indicating that co-
clustering could not only capture the common behaviors but also
the obscure ones (small clusters). In each cluster, the clustered
users will exhibit a different level of value on multiple features
comparing to non-clustered users as we present in Figure 8(b). The
X-axis demonstrates the 27 features used to capture the cluster and
the Y-axis is the mean of features value. Clustered users have a
much higher value on feature 18 and 21 which are the percentage
of capital letters and number of sentences. This explains users in
this cluster exhibits a latent behavior of using more capital letters
and more sentences in their comments.
Using latent behaviors to identifymisbehaving users: 0.77
AUC. In order to show that the latent behaviors can be used to
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Figure 8: Co-clustering. (a) Distribution of users in each clus-
ter. (b) Example of latent behavior from cluster 1.
identify misbehaving users, we takeAmatrix from the co-clustering
result. Each row in thematrix is a user and each column corresponds
to a cluster, with the (i, j) value being the “membership” of user i to
the cluster j .We use these values as features to train a classifier. Note
that for each set of features we use the classifier that yielded the
highest performance. In the case of raw features this was Random
Forest, but for the case of the latent behavior features it was Support
Vector Machine (SVM) 1. We thus report results using SVM. Our
result shows that we can still accurately identify misbehaving users
with an AUC of 0.77 with 86.3% precision and 63.5% recall. The role
classification result is shown in Table 4.
Using latent behaviors to identifymisbehaving roles: 73.3%
overall accuracy.Using 10-fold cross validation, we assess the abil-
ity of our method to identify misbehaving roles, and we show the
results in Table 4.
The overall classification accuracy when using the latent behav-
iors is lower than using the raw features, albeit still very good.
However, we argue that the reduction in accuracy comes with
an increase in the interpretability of the classification using latent
behaviors, as we present below.
Interpreting latent behaviors.Due to the space limitation, we
are not able to discuss all latent behaviors in the data. We will, thus,
focus on the latent behaviors that help us understand misbehaving
users.
(1) Latent behavior 1: Users who exhibit such behavior are, on
average, makingmore comments to articles, are highly active
between 7-13 UTC (midnight in US), use more capital letters
and also more characters and sentences on average in their
comments.
(2) Latent behavior 3: Users are highly active between 13-26
UTC, having ~60% more comments and degrees of collabora-
tion than the average.
(3) Latent behavior 4: Users are active between 3-8 UTC, making
slightly more (24%) comments than the average.
(4) Latent behavior 6: Users are active between 6-14 UTC, mak-
ing comments which have better readability.
Figure 8(a) shows that 87.9% of users who exhibit latent behav-
ior 1 are misbehaving users. This is in contrast to users of latent
behavior 6, which are active at similar periods of time but only
1This behavior is expected since the latent behavior features, contrary to the raw
features, are embeddings of the users in a vector space, thus SVM should work better
than Random Forest.
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Table 4: Role classification result (co-clustering)
Role Precision Recall
Trolls 78.7% 71.2%
Spammers 60.7% 81%
Fanatics 76.4% 73.3%
Benign 71.4% 73.5%
Overall accuracy 73.3%
56% of them are misbehaving users. This explains that using more
capital letters and making longer comments are the characteristic
of misbehaving users.
Another interesting observation here is that, the active period
could also imply whether a user is misbehaving or not. We see that
there is an active time shift from latent behavior 3, latent behavior
4 to latent behavior 6, and the percentage of misbehaving users
are 20.7%, 31.3% and 56% respectively. If we assume that most of
the users are active in the timezone between ET and PT, then we
may further deduce that the later at night a user is active, the more
likely they are to be misbehaving.
6 RELATEDWORK
We only have space to review indicative studies in five areas.
Detectingmalicious behavior. Many studies detect anti-social
behavior [2][1], bots[3][14] or cyber-bullying [10] but they focus on
OSNs. A recent work [2] analyzes the comments on three websites
using Disqus, but the focus is to predict if a user will be banned due
to misbehavior, which is somewhat different from ours: (a) some
misbehaviors are not necessarily reported, as we saw, and (b) we
have a fine-grained definition of misbehavior.
Detectingmalicious behavior. Many studies detect anti-social
behavior [2][1], bots[3][14] or cyber-bullying [10] but they focus on
OSNs. A recent work [2] analyzes the comments on three websites
using Disqus, but the focus is to predict if a user will be banned due
to misbehavior, which is somewhat different from ours: (a) some
misbehaviors are not necessarily reported, as we saw, and (b) we
have a fine-grained definition of misbehavior.
Analyzing text of online users.Many studies leverage textual
analysis to detect spammers on OSNs [17] and blogs [13] or how
to achieve the same objective by analyzing the behavioral patterns
[18].
Modeling and understanding online user behavior. Several
works study temporal and behavioral patterns of OSN users [7]
[5] [9]. Some recent studies also use mobile phones and OSNs to
profile users’ psychological states [20][4].
7 CONCLUSION
We develop a systematic and comprehensive methodology to iden-
tify malicious users on commenting platforms. The novelty of our
work lies in its: (a) fine-grained classification of malicious behavior,
and (b) interpretable approach to classification. From an algorith-
mic point of view our work uses a comprehensive set of 73 features
across four different types of information, and a novel two-stage
classification.
The overall classification accuracy of our approach is 80.8% for
the fine-grained 4-class problem. We also identify several unusual
and surprising behaviors, and we provide a broader understanding
of the users of these platforms.
Our work is a first step towards an efficient, easy-to-understand
and easy-to-manage approach to safeguarding commenting plat-
forms from parasitic and malicious users.
In the future, we aim at: (a) create a public larger labeled datasets
to facilitate further research, (b) consider more categories of ma-
licious roles, and (c) conduct large scale study of the evolution of
malicious behavior on commenting platforms.
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